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RESUMO/ABSTRACT 
 
The determinants of capital structure of Portuguese firms 
This paper investigates the determinants of capital structure based on a sample 
of 2,804 non-financial Portuguese firms, from 2000 to 2009. A standard capital 
structure model is estimated controlling for firm-specific and market factors 
commonly used in the literature. The model is further estimated for sub samples 
of firms based on size, growth opportunities and leverage, as well as for the 
time periods before and during the international financial crisis. The result show 
that firms’ capital structure decision seems to conform more with the pecking 
order theory, rather than with the tradeoff theory. This is also true for different 
groups of firms based on size, growth opportunities and leverage. Finally, the 
results suggest that firms have adjusted their leverage as the international 2008 
crisis begun.  
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Abstract 
This paper investigates the determinants of capital structure based on a sample of 2,804 
non-financial Portuguese firms, from 2000 to 2009. A standard capital structure model 
is estimated controlling for firm-specific and market factors commonly used in the 
literature. The model is further estimated for sub samples of firms based on size, growth 
opportunities and leverage, as well as for the time periods before and during the 
international financial crisis. The result show that firms’ capital structure decision 
seems to conform more with the pecking order theory, rather than with the tradeoff 
theory. This is also true for different groups of firms based on size, growth opportunities 
and leverage. Finally, the results suggest that firms have adjusted their leverage as the 
international 2008 crisis begun.  
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1. Introduction 
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) that corporate leverage decisions have been widely 
studied. Nowadays, the financial and economic crisis has highlighted even more the 
importance of these decisions at a micro level, through the effect on firm value, and at a 
macro level, through the effect on the economy. One of the main debates over the 
capital structure decision relies on its determinants. Our primary aim is to investigate 
the determinants of non-financial firms’ capital structure using a cross section and time-
series variation in a sample of 2,804 Portuguese firms, spanning 19 sectors, from 2000 
until 2009.  
Our contribution relies on the data set and on the methodology we use to 
examine the determinants of firms’ capital structure. We use recent data from 
Portuguese firms, which allows us to consider in our analysis the periods before and 
after the beginning of the current financial crisis. Portugal is an interesting case study 
since in 2011 it received a bailout from the IMF, the European Central Bank and the 
European Commission, and therefore our sample covers some part of the period where 
the financial constrains of Portuguese firms were particularly important.  In addition, we 
not only investigate the determinants of leverage for a full sample of Portuguese firms 
but we also conduct this analysis for sub samples of firms based on some of their 
specific characteristics. 
Two competing theories contribute to the debate of firms’ leverage decisions: 
the pecking order and the tradeoff theory.  Myers (1984) proposed the pecking order 
theory in which there is a financing hierarchy of retained earnings, debt and then equity. 
Alternatively, according to the tradeoff theory of capital structure the firms’ choice of 
leverage is a tradeoff between the benefits and the costs of debt. A major benefit of debt 
may come from the tax advantage of interest deductibility (Kraus and Litzenberger 
(1973)) but it also includes the mitigation of agency problems since debt has the 
disciplining role due to the associated reduction in free cash flow (Jensen (1986)). On 
the other hand, the costs of debt include the direct bankruptcy costs (Warner (1977) and 
Weiss (1990)), as well as indirect costs such as debt overhang (Myers (1977)), asset 
substitution (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) and asset fires (Schleifer and Vishny (1992)). 
The tradeoff theory predicts that the net benefits of debt rise for low leverage firms but 
decrease as leverage becomes high, implying that the net benefits are a nonlinear 
function of leverage. 
 We borrow from the empirical corporate finance literature on non-financial 
firms that has explored the determinants of capital structure of non-financial firms, from 
Titman and Wessels (1998) to Harris and Raviv (1991), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Frank and Goyal (2009) and Korteweg (2010). Our results are in line with most of these 
studies by providing mainly a rejection of the tradeoff theory.  
 We address the determinants of firms’ leverage as follows. First, for all firms in 
our sample we conduct stylized regressions where the dependent variable is a standard 
measure of firms’ leverage, in particular the book leverage, and the independent 
variables are a set of common firm-specific factors analyzed in the literature as 
profitability, size, growth opportunities, tangibility, liquidity, stock level, asset turnover, 
depreciations and firms’ age, and other market variables as the GDP growth, inflation, 
the return on the national stock index and the term spread. We also control for a binary 
variable intended to measure the effect of the years of the recent international crisis on 
leverage. Our aim is to compare the results with the predictions of the pecking and 
tradeoff theories of capital structure and to further explore which theory is validated and 
consequently which theory is rejected. 
 Second, in order to explore whether the effect of these factors on firms’ leverage 
varies across some firms’ characteristics, we estimate the leverage regression for sub 
samples of firms according to their size, growth opportunities and leverage. In addition, 
we carry out these estimations for sub samples according to the time period in order to 
investigate whether these factors affect differently firms’ leverage for different 
economic cycles (before and during the international financial crisis).  
 We show that firms’ capital structure decision do not conform with the tradeoff 
theory predictions as firms with more tangible assets and with less growth opportunities 
tend to have less leverage. Also, older firms are less levered, as they are better known in 
the markets and should be able to more easily issue equity relative to younger firms, 
where the adverse selection problems are more severe. In favor of the validation of the 
tradeoff theory we only find the result that larger firms tend to have higher leverage as 
they are likely to face lower default risk, and firms with more depreciations have less 
leverage.  
 When estimating the leverage model for sub samples based on firms’ size, 
growth opportunities and leverage we find that most variables still do not conform with 
the predictions of the tradeoff theory. The novelty relies on the magnitude of the 
coefficients and on the behavior of some particular variables like asset turnover, 
depreciations, inflation and GDP growth. In addition, we find that the time period 
considered plays a role on the way some of the firm-specific and market variables affect 
the capital structure decision.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
model of firms’ capital structure and examines the predictions of the tradeoff and 
pecking order theories. Section 3 analyses the data and the descriptive statistics of the 
main variables. Section 4 discusses the results of the leverage model for the full sample 
and for the sub samples of firm-specific factors and time periods. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
  
2. The model of firm’s capital structure 
We estimate a firm’s leverage regression where the dependent variable is a measure of 
leverage and the explanatory variables are a set of firms’ specific variables and 
macroeconomic variables, in line with the corporate finance literature (from Titman and 
Wessels (1988), to Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009)). The 
regression equation of firm’s leverage is, therefore, expressed as follows: 
																																																			 = 	+	 + 	 + 	                             (1) 
where Lev is the book leverage and u a stochastic error term. 	 is a set of firm’s 
characteristics, including profitability (Prof), the natural logarithm of total assets (Size), 
firm’s growth opportunities (Growth), tangibility (Tang), liquidity (Liq), stock level 
(Stock), depreciation (Depr), the number of firm’s years (Age), and   is a vector of 
macroeconomic variables, including the GDP growth (GDPGR), inflation (Infl), the 
natural logarithm of stock market volatility (StMktRisk), the term structure of interest 
rates (Term) and a binary variable for the years of the recent international financial 
crisis (Crisis). 
 Leverage (Lev) is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. We use 
book leverage since market values of equity are only available for publicly traded firms. 
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Fama and French (2002), Flannery and Rangan (2006), 
Huang and Ritter (2009) and De Jong et al. (2011) using book or market leverage does 
not yield substantial differences in the results.  In our sample there are only 42 listed 
firms out of 2,804 full sample firms.   
 Profitability (Prof) is either measured as the return on assets (the ratio of net 
income over total assets) or the return on equity (the ratio of net income over book 
equity), in line with Frank and Goyal (2009) and Berger and di Patti (2006), 
respectively. Most empirical studies have found a negative relation between profitability 
and leverage (see Frank and Goyal (2009)), a result that is understood as a rejection of 
the tradeoff theory, in particular the agency hypothesis, and a validation of the pecking 
order theory. On one hand, according to the agency theory of capital structure, we 
should expect a positive relation between profitability and leverage due to the 
disciplining role that debt has on managers, associated with the reduction in free cash 
flow (Jensen (1986)). On the other hand, the pecking order theory predicts a negative 
relation between profitability and leverage due to the fact that more profitable firms are 
willing to use internal financing rather than external financing, in particular debt.  
 Firm’s size (Size) is measured as the value of total assets. The effect of this 
variable on leverage is likely to be positive according to the empirical corporate finance 
literature (Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et al. (2001), 
Aggarwal and Jamdee (2003) and Frank and Goyal (2009)). Larger firms tend to have 
higher leverage as they are likely to face lower default risk and this idea is generally 
understood as a prediction of the tradeoff theory.  
 Firm’s growth opportunities (Growth) are measured by changes in the natural 
logarithm of total assets, in line with the suggestion by Frank and Goyal (2009) and 
Chackraborty (2013). Most empirical corporate finance papers have found a negative 
relation between growth and leverage (Rajan and Zingales (1995), Aggarwal and 
Jamdee (2003) and Frank and Goyal (2009)), a result supported on the tradeoff theory 
idea that growth increases costs of financial distress, reduces free cash flow problems, 
and exacerbates debt-related agency problems (Frank and Goyal (2009)). By contrast, 
the pecking order theory implies that firms with more investments should accumulate 
more debt over time, assuming that profitability is hold fixed. As a consequence, growth 
opportunities and leverage are positively related under the pecking order theory.  
   Tangibility (Tang) is measured as the ratio of fixed assets over total assets, as 
proposed by Frank and Goyal (2009), Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) and Chackraborty 
(2013). According to the tradeoff theory, we should expect a positive relation between 
tangibility and leverage as high tangibility reduces the costs of financial distress and 
mitigates debt-related agency problems (Titman and Wessels (1998), Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Aggarwal and Jamdee (2003), Frank and Goyal (2009) and Korteweg 
(2010)). Tangible assets are easier for outsiders to value and therefore lowers expected 
financial distress costs. Also, tangibility makes more difficult for shareholders to 
substitute high-risk assets for low-risk ones (high tangibility reduces the asset 
substitution effect and hence increases leverage – Jensen and Meckling (1976)). The 
pecking order theory suggests opposite predictions. It argues that low information 
asymmetry associated with tangible assets makes equity issues less costly. As a 
consequence, firms with high tangible assets should have less leverage.  
 Liquidity (Liq) is defined as cash and short-term securities as a percentage of 
short-term debt. Although the tradeoff and the pecking order theories make no clear 
prediction on how liquidity affects leverage, we should expect firms with more liquidity 
buffers to be less leveraged, in line with the results found by Antão and Bonfim (2012) 
in an empirical study about the dynamics of capital structure of Portuguese firms.  
 Stock level (Stock) is measured as inventory over total assets. Although there is 
no clear prediction on how this variable affects leverage according to the tradeoff or 
pecking order theories, we control our estimation for this variable since it captures the 
intensity of capital. 
 Depreciation (Depr) is one of the proxies for non-debt tax shields (Frank and 
Goyal (2009)) and is measured as depreciation over total assets. DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) and Korteweg (2010) show that the non-debt tax shields are a substitute for the 
tax benefits of debt financing and, therefore, we should expect depreciation expenses to 
be negatively related to leverage. This is also a prediction of the tradeoff theory.  
 Firm’s age (Age) is the numbers of firm’s years. The tradeoff theory predicts 
that older firms with better reputations in debt markets face lower debt-related agency 
costs and, therefore, these firms should have relatively more leverage. An opposite 
prediction is made by the pecking order theory. This theory argues that more mature 
firms are better known and they should be able to more easily issue equity relative to 
younger firms where adverse selection problems are more severe (Frank and Goyal 
(2009)).  
 As regards the macroeconomic variables included in our regression, the GDP 
growth (GDPGR) is measured as the annual percentage change of gross domestic 
product, inflation (Infl) is the annual percentage change in average consumer price 
index, stock market volatility (StMktRisk) is the annualized standard deviation of daily 
Portuguese Stock Index (PSI-20) return and the term structure of interest rates (Term) is 
the difference between the 10 year interest rate and the 3 month interest rate on 
government bonds. The crisis variable (Crisis) is a binary variable that takes the value 
of one for the years of the recent international crisis (2007-2009) and zero otherwise 
(2000-2006). This selection of macroeconomic variables follows Frank and Goyal 
(2009), with the exception of the crisis variable that is new to the literature. We believe 
that controlling for this variable is important since Portugal is one of the European 
countries most affected by the recent international crisis, with obvious consequences on 
corporate leverage decisions.   
3. Data and descriptive statistics  
The data come from two sources. Information about firms’ consolidated balance sheets 
and income statements is obtained from the Amadeus database, information about 
publicly traded firms’ stock prices and dividends from Thompson Financial’s 
Datastream database and information about Portuguese economic data from the World 
Economic Outlook database of the IMF. Our sample covers the period 2000-2009, 
which allows us to examine seven years before the international financial crisis (2000-
2006) and three years where the markets have been affected by the crisis (2007-2009). 
Our sample consists of 19,362 firm-years observations, comprising 2,804 firms, across 
19 sectors. Table 1 depicts the number of firms and firm-years across sectors in our 
sample.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables we use in our 
estimations. Portuguese firms have substantial levels of leverage. The median book 
leverage is 64%, whereas the median book leverage in Frank and Goyal (2009) is just 
24%.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 These high levels of the leverage ratio are accompanied by a high standard 
deviation (21%). Figure 1 depicts the distribution of the book leverage and it is clear an 
important dispersion of the variable, varying from 0% to almost 100%.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 The descriptive statistics of the book asset value show a considerable 
heterogeneity in the cross section. The median total book assets is 71,347 thousand 
euros while the standard deviation is 689,316 thousand euros, and the smallest firm has 
an asset value of 3,64 thousand euros while the largest firm has an asset value of 
40,261,557 thousand euros. 
 Comparing some of our statistics with the statistics of Frank and Goyal’s (2009), 
we realize that Portuguese firms are on average less profitable – the median return on 
equity is 8%, lower than the 12% of Frank and Goyal’s (2009) firms. The return on 
equity shows considerable dispersion, with a standard deviation of 30%. In addition, 
tangible assets represent on average 26% of total assets and the median growth of total 
assets is 0.64%.  
 Our sample period is characterized by low economic growth, as the GDP median 
growth is 0.78%. It ranges, however, from a minimum of -2.56% to a maximum of 
3.92%, revealing some economic instability. Note that although the median inflation is 
2.5%, it reached a minimum of -0.84% and a maximum of 4.40%. This economic 
instability is accompanied by a high standard deviation in stock market returns for the 
Portuguese stock index. 
 Finally, Table 3 depicts the correlation coefficients among the main firm-
specific variables. Larger firms tend to be less profitable. A firm’s growth opportunities 
are positively related with profits and leverage. Furthermore, firms with more profits 
tend to have less leverage. 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
  
4. Results 
We examine the estimation of the leverage model in three sections. We start off by 
discussing the results for the full sample of firms and then move forward for the debate 
of the results for sub samples of firms’ characteristics. Finally, we explore the 
determinants of leverage for the sub periods before and during the international 
financial crisis. 
 
4.1 Determinants of firms’ capital structure for full sample 
In this section we discuss the estimation of Equation (1) using the full sample of firm-
years observations. Table 4 presents the results using as profitability measure the Return 
on Assets. We omit from the results the estimation using as profitability measure the 
return on equity since it provided very similar results in terms of significance and sign 
of the estimated coefficients. Column 1 depicts the estimation for all variables in the 
model and column 2 shows the estimation of a refined model with only the statistically 
significant parameters.2 In order to decide whether to apply a random or fixed effects 
estimator we used Hausman (1978) test. A rejection using this test suggested that the 
key random effect assumption (unobserved effect is uncorrelated with each explanatory 
variable) is false, and then the fixed effects were used. 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 The results show that among the firm-specific variables all estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the sign of most 
coefficients suggests a rejection of the tradeoff theory of capital structure and a 
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 Although stock market index volatility and the term structure are part of the empirical model presented 
in Equation (1), we decided to omit these variables from the results as in all estimations, for the full 
sample and sub samples, these variables did not revealed to be statistically significant. 
validation of the pecking order theory, in line with Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank 
and Goyal (2009). In particular, we find that more profitable firms, with more tangible 
assets, and with less growth opportunities tend to have less leverage. Also, older firms 
are less levered, confirming a prediction of the pecking order theory, as they are better 
known in the markets and should be able to more easily issue equity relative to younger 
firms, where the adverse selection problems are more severe.  
There are, however, two coefficients that exhibit signals in line with the 
predictions of the tradeoff theory. First, we find that larger firms tend to have higher 
leverage as they are likely to face lower default risk. Second, firms with more 
depreciations over assets have less leverage, and this is due to the fact that according to 
the tradeoff theory depreciation is one of the proxies for non-debt tax shields and we 
should expect non-debt tax shields to be a substitute for the tax benefits of debt 
financing and, therefore, depreciations expenses to be negatively related to leverage. 
As regards the coefficients of liquidity and stock level, we confirm Antão and 
Bonfim’s (2012) results that firms with more liquidity buffers and with low levels of 
stock tend to have more leverage.  
Finally, we discuss the results of the macroeconomic variables and of the binary 
variable crisis. Among the macroeconomic variables, only the inflation coefficient is 
statistically significant, in this case at a 5% level. Firms tend to have more leverage in 
periods of high inflation, a result that is in line with the predictions of the tradeoff 
theory, according to Taggart (1985), as discussed by Frank and Goyal (2009). Taggart 
(1985) shows that the real value of tax deductions on debt is higher when inflation is 
expected to be high and, as a consequence, the tradeoff theory predicts leverage to be 
positively related to inflation. Another explanation for this positive relation is the 
adoption of a market timing strategy in debt markets if managers issue debt when 
expected inflation is high relative to current interest rates. The results show that during a 
crisis firms exhibit on average greater debt levels, as the coefficient associated with the 
binary variable crisis is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Overall, we conclude from the full sample estimations that the Portuguese firms’ 
capital structure decisions do not seem to comply with the predictions of the tradeoff 
theory, but rather with the predictions of the pecking order theory. Additionally, firms’ 
leverage decisions are affected by the economic cycle, a subject that we will further 
discuss in section 4.3.  
 
4.2 Determinants of leverage for specific firms’ characteristics 
In this section we explore the determinants of leverage for sub samples of firms, 
according to some firms’ characteristics. We estimate Equation (1) for smaller versus 
larger firms, low growth versus high growth firms and low leverage versus high 
leverage firms. As in Frank and Goyal (2009), we investigate whether the determinants 
of firms’ capital structure vary according to some firm-specific characteristics and 
whether the predictions of the tradeoff and pecking order theories depend on these 
characteristics.  
 Table 5 shows the estimation results for the sub samples of firms. The criterion 
used to split the sample into these categories of firms is the median of the corresponding 
variable – book asset value for size, percentage change in book asset value for growth 
opportunities and book leverage for leverage. Thus, smaller (larger) firms have an asset 
value below (above or equal) its median, low (high) growth firms have a percentage 
change in book asset value below (above or equal) its median, and low (high) leverage 
firms have a book leverage ratio below (above or equal) its median.3  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 The results that we obtain for the sub samples of firms’ size (columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 5) are somewhat analogous to the results of the full sample, with the exception of 
two firm-specific variables, asset turnover and depreciation, and the macroeconomic 
variable inflation. Contrary to the full sample and to the small firms’ estimations, where 
it was not statistically significant, the asset turnover coefficient is now statistically 
significant in the regression of larger firms, at a 5% level. For larger firms, a greater 
asset turnover leads to greater leverage. Moreover, the negative relation between 
depreciation and leverage only holds for larger firms, as for this estimation the 
coefficient is statistically significant at a 1% level. Although the coefficient associated 
with inflation was statistically significant in the full sample regression, it became not 
significant for the estimations of the sub samples, at least at a 10% level.   
 The estimations for larger versus smaller firms also indicate that firms’ growth 
opportunities have a greater impact on leverage in smaller firms, as the coefficient of 
growth for these firms is more than twice the coefficient for large firms. A similar effect 
appears in the crisis variable, revealing that smaller firms have increased more their debt 
level during the international financial crisis when compared with larger firms.  
 As regards the estimation results for the sub samples of firms’ growth 
opportunities (columns 3 and 4 of Table 5), most variables exhibit the relations of the 
full sample estimation. The difference in the results relies on the coefficients associated 
with stock level and depreciations, which are no longer statistically significant for high 
growth firms. In addition, although the inflation coefficient is significant for the full 
                                                 
3
 As in the full sample regression, profitability is measured as the return on assets, given that the use of 
the return on equity provides very similar results.  
sample regression, it is no longer statistically significant for the sub samples. As 
concerns the crisis variable, we now observe that our earlier prediction that firms have 
greater debt levels during the international financial crisis does not apply to low growth 
firms. Finally, by comparing the magnitude of some of the coefficients of these two 
regressions, the results show that there is not much difference in this magnitude, with 
the exception of the profitability coefficient that indicates a greater impact of 
profitability on leverage for high growth firms.  
 We now discuss the estimation of the leverage regression considering the split of 
the sample into low and high leverage firms (columns 5 and 6 of Table 5). Once again, 
most variables show the same type of relation with leverage as in the full sample 
regression. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to analyze some new results. First, the asset 
turnover coefficient exhibits a negative sign for high leverage firms, in opposition to the 
positive sign that we obtain for low leverage firms. Second, among the macroeconomic 
variables, we finally obtain significant coefficients for the GDP growth. Even so, the 
coefficients exhibits opposite signs as the high leverage firms tend to have greater 
leverage for low GDP growth, whereas low leverage firms exhibit greater leverage for 
high GDP growth. Finally, the comparison of the magnitude of some coefficients of 
these estimations reveals that the effect of profitability on leverage is greater for high 
leverage firms, whereas the impact of firms’ size and liquidity is greater for low 
leverage firms.  
 Overall, we conclude that the sign displayed by most variables for different 
estimations of the leverage model based on size, growth and leverage is the same. The 
novelty relies on the magnitude of the coefficients and on the behavior of some 
particular variables like asset turnover, depreciations, inflation, GDP growth and crisis.  
 
4.3 Leverage and the international financial crisis  
The data we use to estimate the determinants of leverage covers two distinctive periods 
of the European economy, namely before and during the recent financial crisis (2007 to 
2009). Thus, in this section we investigate whether these determinants vary according to 
the economic cycle, by estimating two leverage regressions for the sub periods 2000 to 
2006 and 2007 to 2009.  Before we proceed with the discussion of the leverage 
regression it is worthwhile, however, to examine the evolution of the mean leverage 
from 2000 to 2009, as shown in Figure 2. Overall, it is characterized by a mixed trend. 
After a slight increase in the mean leverage from 2000 to 2001, reaching 65.19% in 
2001, we then observe three consecutive years of decrease, leading to a mean of 63.86% 
in 2004. Next, it follows four consecutive years of increase, which made the mean 
leverage in 2008 close to the level of 2000, around 64.75%. From 2008 to 2009 there is 
a drop on firms’ mean leverage as it goes from 64.79% to 63.33%. This drop is 
probably explained by the financing problems firms were already experiencing as a 
consequence of the international financial crisis. 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
 Table 6 presents the estimation of the leverage model for the sub periods 2000 to 
2006 and 2007 to 2009. Among the firm-specific variables, profitability, size, growth, 
and liquidity exhibit the same signal and significance as in the full sample regression. 
The exceptions are the variables tangibility, stock level, asset turnover, depreciation and 
firms’ age. Firms with high tangible assets tend to have less leverage only for the crisis 
regression. The stock level coefficient is not significant in both regressions. As regards 
asset turnover, while before the international financial crisis it has no effect on leverage, 
it is negatively related with leverage in the period of crisis. Moreover, the non-debt tax 
shield effect of depreciations does not hold for the crisis period. At last, it is interesting 
the signal and significance of the age coefficients as they are statistically significant in 
both regressions at a 1% level but with opposite signals. Whereas before the 
international financial crisis firms’ age leads to less leverage, a prediction of the pecking 
order theory, during the international crisis older firms engage in more leverage, in line 
with the tradeoff theory. This result suggests that during financial crisis older firms with 
better reputations in debt markets face lower debt-related agency costs and, therefore, 
these firms comply better with external financing problems that exist in debt markets.  
(Insert Table 6 here) 
 The results of the macroeconomic variables indicate that leverage can be 
determined differently by macroeconomic conditions before and during the crisis. While 
GDP growth is positively related to leverage during the financial crisis, it has no effect 
on it before the crisis. As for inflation is concerned, we find that it has a negative effect 
on leverage in a period of crisis but a rather positive effect in a non-crisis period.  
  
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the determinants of capital structure of Portuguese firms and is 
motivated by a substantial cross-sectional variation in firms’ leverage. Portugal has 
received a bailout in 2011 from the IMF, the European Central Bank and the European 
Commission and is particularly interesting to therefore examine the factors affecting 
Portuguese firms’ leverage. 
 Our sample includes 2,804 non-financial firms covering 19 sectors, from 2000 to 
2009. Corporate finance style regressions of leverage are estimated for a full sample of 
firms and then for sub samples based on firms-specific characteristics as size, growth 
opportunities and leverage. In addition, the capital structure model is estimated for the 
time periods before and during the recent international financial crisis, allowing us to 
discuss the effect of the crisis on firms’ capital structure.   
 This paper is, as far as we are concerned, the first to study the determinants of 
Portuguese firms’ leverage for a more recent time period, with data covering the periods 
before and during the recent international crisis. Besides, our contribution to the 
literature relies on the fact that we investigate the determinants of firms’ leverage for 
sub samples of firms based on size, growth opportunities and leverage, making possible 
the discussion on whether the estimation results depend on these specific factors.  
 In line with most recent empirical studies, as Frank and Goyal (2009) and 
Korteweg (2010), our results do not validate the tradeoff theory of capital structure as 
older and more profitable firms, with more tangible assets and with less growth 
opportunities tend to be less levered. In favor of the validation of the tradeoff theory we 
only find the result that larger firms tend to have higher leverage as they are likely to 
face lower default risk, and firms with more depreciations have less leverage.  
 The estimation of the leverage model for sub samples based on firms’ size, 
growth opportunities and leverage reveals that most variables display a sign in 
accordance with the full sample estimation, providing a rejection of the tradeoff theory. 
The difference in the results relies on the magnitude of the coefficients and on the 
behavior of some particular variables like asset turnover, depreciations, inflation and 
GDP growth. We find that some of these variables also affect differently firms’ leverage 
depending on whether we consider the time period before or during the recent 
international financial crisis. 
 Our paper suggests that the recent international financial crisis has determined a 
reduction on the level of Portuguese firms’ leverage and that the capital structure 
decision does depend clearly on a set of firm-specific and market factors. This raises 
important challenges for managers as they have to adjust constantly their financing 
decisions to the evolution of the current European market conditions. Future empirical 
research should aim to examine the determinants of Portuguese firms’ capital structure 
according to the sector where these firms operate in order to investigate whether there is 
a sector effect on leverage. Another interesting development of this work is to 
investigate the determinants of capital structure for Portuguese publicly traded firms 
with the purpose of finding possible differences in the results. 
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Table 1. Number of firms and number of observations by sector 
The sample consists of 2,804 Portuguese firms from the Amadeus database from 2000 to 2009. 
 
 
 
  
Sector Nº of firms Nº of observations
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 28 233
Mining and Quarrying 22 175
Manufacturing 756 6,602
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air 
Conditioning Supply 
24 166
Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste 
Management and Remediation Activities 
21 177
Construction 356 2,875
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of 
Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
816 6,633
Transportation and Storage 135 1,013
Accommodation and Food Service 
Activities 
81 585
Information and Communication 53 375
Financial and Insurance Activities 109 736
Real Estate Activities 130 809
Professional, Scientific and Technical 
Activities 
71 529
Administrative and Support Service 
Activities 
133 947
Public Administration and Defence, 
Compulsory Social Security 
2 12
Education 10 56
Human Health and Social Work Activities 31 200
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 18 123
Other Service Activities 8 44
Total 2,804 22,290
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
The sample consists of 2,804 Portuguese firms from the Amadeus database from 2000 to 2009. 
 
 
 
N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 25 th 50 th 75 th
Book leverage (%) 22287 64.378 20.902 0 99.973 52.121 68.128 79.691
Profitability (%) 22270 3.243 7.024 -85.016 87.771 0.307 2.027 5.397
Total assets (M€) 22287 71.300 689 0.003643 40,300 6,924 14,900 33,900
Growth opportunities (%) 19466 0.637 2.599 -32.938 108.552 -0.193 0.334 1.052
Tangibility (%) 22287 25.879 22.860 0 99.937 7.577 20.128 38.087
Liquidity (%) 22284 6.000 10.094 0 100 0.570 2.186 6.577
Stock level (%) 22287 17.709 19.340 0 99.976 2.252 12.676 26.010
Assets turnover (%) 22287 163.367 189.415 -9.121 4.337.813 67.821 124.129 196.989
Depreciation / assets (%) 22287 4.082 3.968 0 40.501 1.338 2.992 5.613
Age 22206 27.690 18.303 0 108.000 15.000 24.000 36.000
GDP growth 22290 0.776 1.643 -2.562 3.922 -0.006 0.781 1.964
Inflation (%) 22290 2.487 1.311 -0.841 4.402 2.362 2.597 3.086
Stock market risk (%) 22290 15.898 6.416 8.370 33.070 10.530 13.970 18.650
Term structure of interest 
rates (%) 22290 1.499 0.891 0.238 2.983 0.653 1.937 2.125
Crisis (1 for 2007-2009) 22290 0.351 0.477 0 1 0 0 1
Distribution
Table 3. Correlations 
The sample consists of 2,804 Portuguese firms from the Amadeus database from 2000 to 2009. Numbers 
between brackets indicate p-values. 
 
 
Book 
leverage
Profitabi-
lity
Log(total 
assets)
Growth 
opportu-
nities
Tangibi-
lity Liquidity
Stock 
level
Asset 
turnover
Deprecia-
tions Age
Book leverage 1
Profitability
-0.364              
(0.000)        1
Log(total 
assets)
-0.061           
(0.000)
-0.070          
(0.000) 1
Growth 
opportunities
0.169          
(0.000)
0.112          
(0.000)
-0.051          
(0.000) 1
Tangibility
-0.089          
(0.000)
-0.109          
(0.000)
0.059          
(0.000)
-0.069           
(0.000) 1
Liquidity
-0.131          
(0.000)
0.260          
(0.000)
-0.243          
(0.000)
0.027           
(0.000)
-0.126         
(0.000) 1
Stock level
0.061          
(0.000)
-0.076          
(0.000)
-0.040           
(0.000)
-0.033         
(0.000)
-0.154           
(0.000)
-0.071           
(0.000) 1
Asset turnover
0.054           
(0.000)
0.275            
(0.000)
-0.525           
(0.000)
-0.014           
(0.059)
-0.141            
(0.000)
0.317           
(0.000)
0.104           
(0.000) 1
Depreciations
-0.142           
(0.000)
0.081           
(0.000)
-0.112           
(0.000)
-0.102            
(0.000) 
0.645            
(0.000)
0.045           
(0.000)
-0.095          
(0.000)
0.150           
(0.000) 1
Age
-0.262           
(0.000) 
-0.025           
(0.000)
0.237           
(0.000)
-0.131           
(0.000)
0.059            
(0.000)
-0.026           
(0.000)
0.112            
(0.000)
-0.069          
(0.000)
0.022            
(0.001) 1
Table 4. Book leverage for complete and reduced model 
The sample consists of 2,804 Portuguese firms from the Amadeus database from 2000 to 2009. The 
dependent variable is the book leverage. The complete model considers all significant and non-significant 
coefficients whereas the reduced model only considers the significant coefficients. Numbers between 
brackets indicate the standard error. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 
10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Leverage ratio                          (complete model)       
Leverage ratio                                   
(reduced model)
Coefficient Coefficient
-16.557***   -16.624***
(3.500) (3.422)
  -0.557***     -0.558***
(0.014) (0.014)
 14.673***    14.682***
(0.469) (0.464)
   0.388***      0.389***
(0.029) (0.029)
  -0.045***     -0.045***
(0.010) (0.010)
  -0.146***     -0.145***
(0.011) (0.011)
   0.037***      0.037***
(0.011) (0.011)
  -0.001
(0.001)
  -0.097**     -0.098**
(0.044) (0.043)
  -0.799***     -0.799***
(0.061) (0.059)
  -0.001
(0.065)
   0.155*      0.153**
(0.093) (0.069)
   0.895***      0.895***
(0.223) (0.228)
R2 0.093 0.091
Nº of observations  19,362  19,362
Stock level
Asset turnover
Depreciations
Age
Constant
Log(size)
Profitability
Crisis (1 for 2007-2009)                      
GDP growth
Inflation
Growth
Tangibility
Liquidity
Table 5. Firms’ characteristics and book leverage 
The sample consists of 2,804 Portuguese firms from the Amadeus database from 2000 to 2009. The 
dependent variable is the book leverage. For each firm-characteristic, the sample is divided in two sub 
samples, considering the median as the splitting point. Numbers between brackets indicate the standard 
error. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  
Smaller                  
firms
Larger                         
firms
Low                               
growth   
High                        
growth  
Low                            
debt
High                                
debt
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
-39.719*** -27.408*** -37.156***   4.918  -51.070*** 49.211***
(4.800) (7.664) (6.663) (4,683) (5.851) (2.695)
-0.540***  -0.545***  -0.510*** -0.723*** -0.298***  -0.412***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.017) (0.015)
19.481***  14.905***  16.810*** 11.931***  17.161***  6.237***
(0.727) (0.976) (0.861) (0.664) (0.779) (0.382)
  0.525*** 0.238*** 0.311**  0.210*** 0.164*** 0.183***
(0.044) (0.039) (0.128) (0.037) (0.041) (0.023)
 -0.042***  -0.028** -0.047*** -0.052*** -0.049*** -0.031***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008)
-0.144***  -0.115***  -0.161*** -0.139***  -0.109***  -0.014
(0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011)
   0.049***  0.065***  0.047***   0.015  0.082***  0.021***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.008)
 -0.001   0.008** 0.002   0.002  0.004**  -0.005***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010)
0.038 -0.211***  -0.168**   0.052  -0.009 -0.118***
(0.057) (0.066) (0.067) (0.068) (0.061) (0.035)
 -1.018*** -0.702*** -0.682*** -0.800*** -0.763*** -0.471***
(0.080) (0.086) (0.092) (0.090) (0.080) (0.048)
 -0.012  -0.024  -0.068  -0.101  0.149**   -0.102**
(0.082) (0.092) (0.100) (0.094) (0.084) (0.050)
  0.183   0.077   0.016 0.418*** 0.085 0.051
(0.121) (0.128) (0.139) (0.140) (0.121) (0.07)
  0.929***   0.539*   0.497 1.151***  0.532** 0.655***
(0.292) (0.324) (0.362) (0.325) (0.301) (0.175)
R2 0.11  0.10  0.07   0.12   0.02   0.08
Nº of observations 9,532   9,830 9,665 9,697 9,805 9,557
Stock level
Profitability
Asset turnover
Depreciation
Dependent variable: 
leverage ratio
Tangibility
Crisis (1 for 2007-2009)
Inflation
GDP growth
Age
Constant
Log(size)
Growth
Liquidity
Table 6. Economic cycle and book leverage 
The sample consists of 2,804 Portuguese firms from the Amadeus database from 2000 to 2009. The 
dependent variable is the book leverage. The sample is divided in two periods, having in mind the 
international financial crisis: 2000 – 2006 (before crisis) and 2007 – 2009 (during crisis). Numbers 
between brackets indicate the standard error. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, the 
5% and the 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Before crisis During the crisis
Coefficient Coefficient
     -34.174***     -1,070.676***
(4.929) (247.741)
      -0.544***        -0.492***
(0.018) (0.020)
      18.061***        14.924***
(0.698) (1.052)
       0.370***        0.261***
(0.035) (0.055)
 -0.001        -0.168***
(0.012) (0.019)
       -0.121***        -0.138***
(0.015) (0.019)
  0.016  -0.010
(0.014) (0.020)
  0.000        -0.005***
(0.002) (0.001)
       -0.213***   0.004
(0.056) (0.083)
       -0.966***        34.800***
(0.070) (8.331)
  0.042        17.377***
(0.082) (4.074)
        0.293***        -2.426***
(0.152) (0.613)
R2    0.08  0.04
Nº of observations 11,621 7,741
Asset turnover
Depreciation
Age
GDP growth
Inflation
Profitability
Log(size)
Growth
Tangibility
Liquidity
Stock level
Dependent variable:                        
leverage ratio
Constant
Figure 1. Distribution of book leverage 
The figure shows the distribution of firms’ book leverage ratio for the 22,287 firm-year observations in 
the sample of 2,804 Portuguese firms, from the Amadeus database covering the years 2000 to 2009.  
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Figure 2. Evolution of mean book leverage 
The figure shows the evolution of firms’ mean book leverage for the 22,287 firm-year observations in the 
sample of 2,804 Portuguese firms, from the Amadeus database covering the years 2000 to 2009. 
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